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CUSTOMERS OF BROKERAGE FIRMS GRANTED RIGHT OF ACTION AGAINST
ACCOUNTANTS PREPARING MISLEADING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS UNDER
SECTION 17(a) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
Redington v. Touche Ross & Co.
The certified public accountant has played an increasingly
important role in the field of securities regulation since the enact-
ment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' The regulations pro-
mulgated under section 17(a) ,2 which require brokers to file reports
of their financial status, mandate accountant certification of var-
ious reports. 3 These reports often provide the basis for investment
decisions. It has become the task of the federal courts to determine
if and under what circumstances the "reporting provisions"' of the
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
2 Id. § 78q(a). Prior to its amendment in 1975, section 17(a) provided, in pertinent part:
Every national securities exchange, every member thereof, every broker or dealer
who transacts a business in securities through the medium of any such member...
shall make, keep, and preserve for such periods, such ... records, and make such
reports, as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission by its rules and regulations
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors. Such ... records shall be subject at any time or from time to time to
such reasonable periodic, special, or other examinations by examiners or other
representatives of the Commission as the Commission may deem necessary or ap-
propriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 897 (1934) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976)). The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29,89 Stat.
97 (1975) (amending § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1976)) enlarged the classes of persons who must
file reports and added a disclosure provision requiring brokers to send their customers an
annual certified balance sheet along with other mandatory financial statements. See §
17(a)(1), (e)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)(1), (e)(1)(B) (1976).
E.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(f) - (j), (in) (1978). Rule 17a-5 delineates the required
content and objectives of the accountant's review. Id. § 240.17a-5(e) (content of reports); id.
§ 240.17a-5(f)(1) (qualification of accountants); id. § 240.17a-5(g) (audit objectives); id. §
240.17a-5(i) (provisions of accountants' reports); id. § 240.17a-5(j) (report on material inade-
quacies). In 1973, rule 17a-5 was amended to require accountants to report any inadequacies
in the broker-dealer's accounting system and internal auditing control as well as the proce-
dures for safeguarding securities. See Exchange Act Release No. 10,398 (Sept. 20, 1973)
[1973] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,516, at 83,416-17. See generally Isbell, An Overview of
Accountants' Duties and Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Laws and a Closer Look at
Whistle-Blowing, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 261 (1974); Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals
Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 1 (1973).
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976)
(issuers must file with SEC information necessary to keep information in issuer's registration
statement current); 1934 Act § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (person acquiring beneficial owner-
ship of more than 5% of certain classes of securities must file statements with issuer, each
exchange where security is traded and SEC); 1934 Act § 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (institu-
tional investment managers using interstate commerce and exercising investment discretion
with respect to specified classes of securities of a specified aggregate fair market value must
file reports with SEC); 1934 Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (registered issuers must file
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securities laws give rise to private causes of action against those who
prepare mandatory reports.5 Considering section 17(a) in Redington
v. Touche Ross & Co.,' the Second Circuit recently held that cus-
tomers7 of an insolvent brokerage firm may maintain an action for
damages against an accountant responsible for the preparation of a
misleading statement.8
In 1969, Weis Securities, Inc. (Weis), a broker-dealer registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission' and a member of the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. 0 engaged Touche Ross & Company
(Touche Ross) to serve as its certified public accountant." Touche
Ross was responsible for the preparation, audit, and certification of
the financial reports required of Weis under section 17(a) of the Act
and Rule 17a-5. 2 In 1972 five of Weis' officers allegedly prepared
false financial statements in an effort to conceal the firm's grave
financial condition from the SEC and the public. 13 Relying on these
statements, Touche Ross prepared and certified financial reports
without expressing any reservations concerning Weis' financial sta-
tus or mode of operation. 4 After Weis' true financial condition was
reports of supplemental information concerning registered securities).
3 See, e.g., In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974) (construing 1934
Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976)); Dewitt v. American Stock Transfer Co., [1977-1978
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,089 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (construing 1934 Act, § 15(d), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o(d) (1976)); Meyers v. American Leisure Time Enterprises, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 213,
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976) (construing 1934 Act §
13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976)); cf. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(private right of action may exist against accountants under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1976) provided scienter demostrated).
592 F.2d 617 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 563 (1978).
Rule 17a-5(c)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(c)(4) (1977), defines "customer" as "any person
for whom the broker or dealer holds securities for safekeeping or as collateral or for whom
the broker or dealer carries a free credit balance."
'592 F.2d at 619.
Section 15 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976), requires broker-dealers to register
with the SEC.
0 As a registered securities exchange, the New York Stock Exchange is responsible for
insuring that its members comply with the laws and rules governing securities transactions,
§ 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976).
' 592 F.2d at 619.
12 Id.; see Rule 17a-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1973) (revised 40 Fed. Reg. 59, 712-17
(1975)). Section 4 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976), authorizes the SEC to promulgate
such rules and regulations as it deems necessary to effectuate the provisions of the statute.
11 592 F.2d at 619. Weis' officers allegedly overstated assets and income, understated
liabilities and expenses and reported fictitious assets, creating the appearance that Weis'
earnings for fiscal 1972 were $1,700,000 when in it they had lost more than $1,500,000. Com-
plaint at 4, 10, 592 F.2d at 617.
" Brief for Appellant at 7, 592 F.2d at 617; see id. at 620.
Under Rule 17a-5, the accountant's certificate is required to include the accountant's
opinion concerning the financial statement. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(i)(3) (1978). Any matter
1979]
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revealed through investigations conducted by the Exchange and the
SEC," the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) 6 peti-
tioned for a decree declaring that Weis' customers were in need of
protection under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970
(SIPA) . 7 A federal district judge ordered Weis' liquidation and ap-
pointed the plaintiff, Edward S. Redington, trustee for the liquida-
tion."8 SIPC and Redington subsequently commenced an action for
damages against Touche Ross under section 17(a),19 contending
that the accounting firm's certification of the false financial state-
ments masked Weis' precarious condition at a time when liquida-
tion could have been prevented or the losses minimized. 20 The
to which the accountant takes exception should be indicated and the effect of the exception
on the corresponding item in the report should be noted. Id. § 240.17a-5(i)(4).
15 Complaint at 5, 13, 592 F.2d at 617. After discovering that Weis had been violating
the financial responsibility rules of the SEC, the Commission sought and obtained an injunc-
tion against the firm and its officers to prevent further violation of the Act. Id. at 620; see 15
U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976).
1, Congress enacted the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. §§
78aaa-78111 (1976), in an effort to "restore investor confidence in the capital markets, and
upgrade the financial responsibility requirements for registered brokers and dealers." SIPC
v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975). The SIPA created SIPC, SIPA § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc
(1976), a nonprofit corporation whose membership includes all registered brokers and dealers
and all members of national securities exchanges. Its primary purpose is to "afford financial
protection" to all members' customers. S. REP. No. 1218, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970). This
purpose is accomplished by means of a fund which is maintained by assessments on members
and used to reimburse customers of insolvent members up to a maximum of $50,000 per
customer. 15 U.S.C. § 78ddd (1976).
17 SIPA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(2) (1976), provides:
If SIPC determines that any member has failed or is in danger of failing to meet
its obligations to customers and that there exists one or more of the conditions
specified in subsection (b)(1)(A) of this section, SIPC, upon notice to such member,
may apply to any court of competent jurisdiction ... for a decree adjudicating that
customers of such member are in need of the protection provided by this chapter.
The "conditions" warranting SIPC action include: (1) insolvency under the Bankruptcy Act,
11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1976); (2) bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. § 21 (1976); (3) the appointment
of a receiver, trustee or liquidator; (4) violation of the rules, regulations or provisions of the
1934 Act concerning financial responsibility and hypothecation of customers securities; and
(5) inability to make the computations necessary for compliance with the rules of financial
responsibility and hypothecation. Id.
"1 Once an adjudication is made pursuant to an application by SIPC, see note 17 supra,
the court must appoint a trustee for the liquidation of the member's business and an attorney
designated by the SIPC to act as the trustee's counsel. SIPA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(b)(3)
(1976).
11 592 F.2d at 620 n.5. The trustee was able to return to Weis' customers only 67% of
their investment money. Since SIPC insures accounts for only $20,000 in cash and $50,000
in cash and securities, see note 8 supra, some of Weis' customers were not fully compensated.
21 One year before commencing suit in federal court, SIPC and the trustee in liquidation
instituted a common law negligence action against Touche Ross in a New York state court.
Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., No. 13996/76 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, filed July 3, 1975). In
the federal suit, the common law claims were joined with a claim for relief under § 17(a).
19791 SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1977 TERM
district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.2' On appeal, a divided Second Cir-
cuit panel22 reversed and remanded.?
Writing for the Redington majority, Judge Lumbard first exam-
ined section 17(a) in light of the four factors which the Supreme
Court, in Cort v. Ash, 24 deemed "relevant" to the question whether
a private remedy may be inferred from a statute not expressly pro-
viding one.? He noted that the reports required by section 17(a) and
the periodic examinations to which they may be subject are "for the
protection of investors" and concluded customers of broker-dealers
are within "the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted. '2 16
Looking to the second of the Ash factors, the Redington court
found no "indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either
to create [a private] remedy or to deny one. 2 7 Accordingly, it
592 F.2d at 620.
21 Id.
2 Judge Lumbard authored the majority opinion. A separate concurring opinion was
written by Judge Timbers and Judge Mulligan dissented.
21 On remand the district court was to determine whether the federal suit should be
stayed in favor of the state action, whether pendent jurisdiction over the common law claims
should be exercised and what standards should be used to establish an accountant's liability
under § 17(a). 592 F.2d at 625.
24 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
" 592 F.2d at 621 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). The Ash criteria recently were
reaffirmed in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977). Similarly, in Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978) (White, J., concurring), Justice White relied
Ash to determine whether a private right of action exists under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d to -4 (1976).
2, 592 F.2d at 621. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78) (emphasis added); see 15 U.S.C.
§ 78q(a) (1976). In addition to the express language of § 17(a), the Redington court noted
that "an arsenal of [required] reports" exists to protect brokers' customers. 592 F.2d at 622.
Financial reports must be audited and certified by independent certified public accountants.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5(d) (1978). The accountants' certificate is required to state whether
the accountant reviewed the procedures followed "for safeguarding securities." Id. 240.17a-
5(i)(2)(ii). One of these procedures is the "net capital rule," id. § 240.15c3-1, which requires
a broker to maintain a specified minimum ratio of liquid assets to aggregate indebtedness in
order to satisfy 72,129 (1967). The Redington court reasoned that failure to supply accurate
reports deprives brokers' customers of the protection to which they are entitled since the
mandated reports constitute the sole avenue through which the SEC can obtain the informa-
tion necessary for enforcement of the net capital rule. 592 F.2d at 622.
2 422 U.S. at 78; see 592 F.2d at 621-22. The court distinguished § 17(a) from other
statutes which have been held not to give rise to private causes of action on the ground that
the latter evinced a clear legislative intent to confine the enforcement prerogative to specific
governmental agencies. Id. at 622. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); (Federal Election
Commission); SIPC v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975) (SEC); National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (Attorney General)). The Second
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sought to discern whether under the third factor it would be
"consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme
to imply" a private cause of action under section 17(a).2 Noting that
criminal prosecutions"9 and SEC injunctive suits would not restore
to Weis' customers the money that they had lost, Judge Lumbard
concluded that the statutory remedies were not sufficient to effec-
tuate fully the legislative purpose of broker-dealer customer protec-
tion.3 1 Moreover, since the SEC does not have the ability to be the
sole guardian of the securities industry,3' the Redington majority
reasoned that a "private remedy is an essential supplement to the
scheme of enforcement of section 17. ' '32
Circuit, however, recently has indicated that the power to enforce the various securities acts
should not necessarily be restricted to the SEC. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 874
n.19 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
28 422 U.S. at 78; see 592 F.2d at 621. In Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 874
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978), the Second Circuit noted that even in the
absence of "specific statements of legislative intent," an examination of underlying legis-
lative purposes might support the creation of a private right of recovery. Such an examina-
tion is justified, in the Abrahamson court's view, since an explicit direction from Congress
would obviate the need for further judicial inquiry. 568 F.2d at 874-75; accord, SIPC v.
Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Corp. v. National Ass'n of Passengers, 414 U.S.
453 (1974).
2 592 F.2d at 623. Although at least one court has held that making false entries in the
records required by § 17 constitutes a criminal offense, United States v. Sloan, 389 F. Supp.
526, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the existence of potential criminal sanctions does not necessarily
preclude civil liability, see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 79 (1975).
" 592 F.2d at 623; see note 26 and accompanying text supra.
31 592 F.2d at 623. In 1976, there were over 5,000 broker-dealers registered with the
SEC. Since close regulation of such a large number of firms is extremely difficult, the SEC
and the investing public must depend largely upon the certified reports filed by broker-
dealers. The threat of damages actions, the SEC has stated, would help to "assure proper
professional conduct" on the part of both broker-dealers and accountants. Brief of the SEC,
amicus curiae, at 25 n.37, 592 F.2d at 617; see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In
Borak, a stockholder sought to recover damages and have a merger declared void on the
ground that it was the product of a fraudulent proxy solicitation which involved § 14(a) of
the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). Observing that it is impossible for the SEC to examine
all of the proxy statements issued each year, the Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff's pri-
vate cause of action as "a necessary supplement to Commission action." 377 U.S. at 432.
32 592 F.2d at 623. In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit in Redington noted
that the concept of ''statutory tort," breach of a statutorily created duty, lends further
support to the propriety of implying a private cause of action under § 17(a). This theory
has been applied to justify the creation of a private cause of action in other areas of securities
law. Id.; see, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (§ 78j(b));
J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (§ 78n(a)); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) (§ 78f(b)); Spoon v. Walston & Co., 345 F. Supp. 518
(E.D. Mich. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 478 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1973) (§ 78g); Goodman v. H.
Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (§ 78o(b)(5)(E); Remar v. Clayton Sec. Corp.,
81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949) (§ 78g). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS §
286 (1965).
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Turning to the fourth Ash factor, whether "the cause of action
[is] one traditionally relegated to state law . . . so that it would
be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law,"33 the court decided that creation of a federal right was justified
in light of the national character of the problem of broker regulation
and the exclusivity of federal jurisdiction over actions arising under
the securities laws.34 Finally, the court rejected the district court's
finding that section 18(a) of the Act, which imposes liability for
misleading statements,5 provides the exclusive remedy for section
17(a) violations. 6 Noting that brokers' customers are the "favored
wards of section 17,"3' the Redington majority reasoned that Con-
gress could not have intended to limit the means of redress to Sec-
tion 18(a), which permits recovery only by those who have actually
purchased or sold securities.38
3 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); see 592 F.2d at 621; J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963).
-' 592 F.2d at 623.
15 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976). Section 18(a), establishing "liability for misleading state-
ments," provides:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application,
report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation thereun-
der . . . which statement was at the time and in the light of the circumstances
under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall
be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading)
who, in reliance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a
price which was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance,
unless the person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge
that such statement was false or misleading.
592 F.2d at 623.
U Id.
-u The "purchase or sale" doctrine was upheld by the Supreme Court in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736 (1975). The Blue Chip Stamps Court noted
that the "express . . . private civil remedies, created by Congress . . . for violations of
various provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts are by their terms expressly limited to purchasers
or sellers of securities." Id. at 735-36; cf. Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (sale of securities during liquidation satisfies Blue Chip rule where fraud
designed to induce sale). In addition to the "purchase or sale" doctrine, there are two pre-
requisites for § 18(a) actions. First, there must be actual, not constructive, reliance on the
document. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
Second, the price at which the security was purchased or sold must have been affected by
the false or misleading report. Rich v. Touche Ross & Co., 415 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Since misrepresentation in a § 17(a) report would never affect the price of a security, plaintiffs
such as those in Redington, whose loss was the result of a broker's financial collapse, are
precluded from recovering under § 18(a). 592 F.2d at 623.
In addition to its.determination that a private action could be predicated upon § 17(a),
the Redington court held that the action could be maintained for the benefit of Weis' custom-
ers by the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) as subrogee and by the trustee
in liquidation in his capacity as bailee for the customers. The court reasoned that SIPC's role
as an insurer entitled it to the benefit of the common law rule of subrogation, which permits
recoupment of payments made. Id. at 624 (citing SEC v. Albert & Maguire Sec. Co., [1977-
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In his dissenting opinion, Judge Mulligan contended that sec-
tion 17(a) does not give rise to a cause of action in favor of the
customers of broker-dealers. Observing that the Ash factors are to
be applied only when the statute in question does not expressly
provide a remedy, he concluded that they were improperly used in
Redington since, in his view, section 18(a) demonstrates a congres-
sional intention to exclude all other remedies. 0 In addition, Judge
1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,129, at 92,076 (3d Cir. 1977)). Acknow-
leging that the SIPA delineates SIPC's subrogation rights, SIPA § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(f)(1)
(1976), the court nonetheless found no legislative intent to abrogate common law subrogation
rights. 592 F.2d at 624; cf. Ackerman v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 18
App. Div. 2d 307, 239 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1st Dep't 1963) (delineation of subrogation rights of
statutorily created motor vehicle insurer does not abrogate common law right of subroga-
tion). But cf. SIPC v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 168 (D. Utah 1975) (SIPC
should not be viewed as insurer); Rogers v. National Sur. Co., 116 Neb. 170, 216 N.W. 182
(1927) (statute's delineation of subrogation rights of "guaranty fund" for depositors of state
banks precludes common law right of subrogation). The Redington court also noted that a
contrary ruling would result in violaters of the statute receiving a "windfall benefit" from
the existence of SIPC in contravention of legislative policy. 592 F.2d 624. The court de-
clined to rule on the separate question whether SIPC was entitled to bring suit on its own
behalf but observed that SIPC could not be considered a member of the class for whose
benefit the Act was enacted, since the legislation which created SIPC was not enacted until
1970. Id. n.13.
Finally, the Redington court rejected the trustee's claim that he was entitled to sue as
Weis' representative. Id. at 624. The court reasoned that, as members of the class sought
to be regulated by § 17, neither broker-dealers nor their representatives may avail them-
selves of any right of action that might arise under it. Id. at 624-25 (citing Piper v. Chris-
Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 37 (1977) and Lank v. New York Stock Exch., 548 F.2d 61, 65
(2d Cir. 1977)). The court however, held that the trustee was entitled to sue in his capacity
as bailee of the customers' funds. 592 F.2d at 625. See SEC v. Albert & Maguire Sec. Co.,
[1977-1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH] 96,129, at 92,076 (3d Cir. 1977); cf. Buttrey v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969)
(trustee in bankruptcy of stockbroker permitted to maintain § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 actions
on behalf of broker's customers).
" 592 F.2d at 627 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). In addition to finding no cause of action
under § 17(a), Judge Mulligan dissented from the majority's holding concerning the right
of SIPC and the trustee to bring suit. 592 F.2d at 634; see note 38 supra. Applying the prin-
ciple of expessio unius est exclusio alterius, see note 40 infra, the dissent reasoned that
SIPC's subrogation rights as outlined by SIPA § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78fff(f) (1) (1976) were
exclusive. 592 F.2d at 634-35. (Mulligan, J., dissenting) (citing Rogers v. National Sur. Co.,
116 Neb.'170, 216 N.W. 182 (1927)). Moreover, Judge Mulligan viewed the majority's decision
as a circumvention of congressional intent. Finally, while concurring with the conclusion that
the trustee could not sue on behalf of Weis, Judge Mulligan rejected the majority's reasoning
in permitting him to sue as bailee of the Weis customers' property. No. 77-7183, slip op. at
2741 (Mulligan, J., dissenting).
10 No. 77-7183, slip op. at 1726 (Mulligan, J., dissenting) (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 78 (1975)). Judge Mulligan relied on the principle of statutory construction, expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. The validity of this rule recently was upheld in SIPC v. Barbour,
421 U.S. 412 (1975), and National R.R. Passenger Corp., v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers,
414 U.S. 453 (1974). The limiting language of § 18(a) and the existence of other sections in
the Act providing for private actions lent support to Judge Mulligan's finding of congressional
intent to deny broker-dealers' customers a private right of action. 592 F.2d at 630 (Mulli-
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Mulligan noted that the Supreme Court recently held that a private
cause of action may not be implied unless it is "necessary . .. to
accomplish the primary congressional goal.""1 Since he found that
section 17(a)'s "prophylactic 4 2 purpose was served more effectively
by the threat of liquidation under the SIPA and criminal sanctions
than by the threat of private damage actions, Judge Mulligan con-
cluded that an implied private right was not a necessary component
of the legislative scheme. 3
In the 44 years since its enactment, no court has considered
whether section 17(a) gives rise to a private cause of action for
damages.4 4 The question of implied causes of action has arisen, how-
ever, in connection with other reporting provisions of the securities
laws. The courts that have considered these reporting sections uni-
gan, J., dissenting); see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78e, 78p(b), 78t (1976). The concurrence in Redington
noted, however, that the Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 730 (1975), implied a right of action under § 10(b) of the Act despite the lack of
contrary evidence of legislative intent. 592 F.2d at 626 (Timbers, J., concurring).
1 Id. at 631 (Mulligan, J., dissenting) (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S.
1, 25 (1977) (emphasis omitted)). Judge Mulligan also argued that the liberal policy in
favor of implying private rights of action under the 1934 Act, see J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426 (1964), has been curtailed by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See Piper
v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); SIPC v.
Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). He concluded that the majority had "misapplied" the
reasoning in these decisions. 592 F.2d at 628 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). See generally
Climan, Civil Liability Under the Credit-Regulation Provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 206 (1978); Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak
and Ash: Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392 (1975); Note,
Implication of Private Actions from Federal Statutes: From Borak to Ash, 1 J. CORP. L. 371
(1976).
42 592 F.2d at 633 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). Since the § 17(a) requirements provide
the SEC with the information needed to enforce the net capital rule, see note 26 supra,
Judge Mulligan reasoned that the protection Congress sought to give the customers of
broker-dealers consists solely of "a system of reports and monitoring which would prevent
insolvency of broker-dealers." Id. (Mulligan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
" Id. at 634 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). Judge Mulligan further observed that if
scienter were held to be the standard for accountant liability in § 17(a) actions as it is for §
10(b) suits, see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), a state common law action
would provide a better opportunity for recovery than would the remedy created by the
Redington majority. 592 F.2d at 633 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). The dissent also found
unpersuasive the argument that a § 17(a) private action should be implied to assist the
SEC in its regulatory functions stating: "'[I]nstitutional limitations alone do not lead to
the conclusion that any party. . . should have a cause of action for damages.'" Id. (Mulli-
gan, J., dissenting) (quoting Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977)).
" In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court deferred the
question whether an accountant may be held liable for damages under § 17(a). 425 U.S. at
194 n.13.
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formly have held that they do not give rise to private rights of
action.45
In In re Penn Central Securities Litigation,4" for example, the
Third Circuit ruled that section 18(a) provides the exclusive private
remedy for violations of section 13(a) of the Act, which requires
issuers to keep their registration statements current.47 Significantly,
the Penn Central court expressed concern that a contrary ruling
would circumvent the recently reaffirmed requirement that the
plaintiff have suffered loss in his capacity as a purchaser or seller
of securities.18 In Myers v. American Leisure Time Enterprises,
Inc.,49 the court applied reasoning similar to that utilized in Penn
Central and dismissed an action based on section 13(d), a reporting
provision aimed at a designated class of securities holders. " Finally,
section 15(d),51 another of the reporting sections applicable to is-
suers, has been held not to give rise to a private cause of action.
52
11 See notes 46-52 and accompanying text infra.
46 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974).
7 Id. at 540; see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1976).
' 494 F.2d at 540; see note 38 supra. Other courts relying upon the Third Circuit's
opinion in Penn Central have rejected section 13(a) suits. In re Equity Funding Corp. of
America Litigation (EFCA), 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (§ 13(a) and rules promulgated
thereunder "administrative devices" not intended to create rights other than those supplied
by § 18(a)); McLaughlin v. Cambell, 410 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Mass. 1976) (no private remedy
exists for any reporting section); duPont v. Wyly, 376 F. Supp. 23 (D. Del. 1973).
In several early cases, courts within the Second Circuit construed § 13(a) to permit a
private right of action. E.g., Kroese v. Crawford, [1961-1964] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,262 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). In Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), § 13(a)-
based causes of action were dismissed due to the plaintiff's failure to demonstrate reliance
upon the misleading document. The court did not, however, reconsider the existence of
private rights of action under the statute. By 1970, some courts were questioning whether such
a cause of action was proper. Smith v. Murchison, 310 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); accord
Robbins v. Banner Indus., Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). As late as 1973, however,
a district court denied a motion to dismiss a § 13(a) claim without any comment on the issue.
In re Caesar's Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The trend since
the Third Circuit's holding in In re Penn Central Sec. Litigation, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974),
has been to dismiss all private § 13(a) claims. See DeWitt v. American Stock Transfer Co.
[1977-1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 96,089 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Levy v. Johnson, [1976-
1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 95,899 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Meer v. United Brands Co., 11976-
1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 95,648 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
,1 402 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976).
402 F. Supp. at 215; see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976).
15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1976).
52 Dewitt v. American Stock Transfer Co., [1977-1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,089 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Unlike most of the cases in which reporting sections of the Act
were held not to give rise to private remedies, see notes 47-52 and accompanying text supra,
Dewitt involved a failure to file rather than the issuance of a false or misleading statement
in a filed report. The court, however, did not consider this difference significant. But cf.
Kerber v. Kakos, 383 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (private right of action exists against
issuer who "ignores registration requirements" although § 18(a) is exclusive remedy for
filing false and misleading statements).
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1977 TERM
In each case where a claim predicated upon a reporting provi-
sion was rejected, the decisive factor was the court's determination
that section 18(a) is the "catch-all" liability provision,5 3 precluding
all other remedies. In view of the legislative scheme underlying all
the reporting sections in the securities laws, it is submitted that
section 17(a) should be subject to the same reasoning. When it
enacted the 1934 Act, Congress apparently viewed section 17(a) and
the other reporting provisions as a unit 4 with the single purpose of
insuring the availability of information which investors need to for-
mulate intelligent investment decisions. 5 Public disclosure of infor-
mation contained in required reports was viewed as a method of
preserving "honest markets, '5 6 while investor protection was the
overriding goal.5 7 Once it is recognized that section 18(a) provides
"3 In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modified
on other grounds, 357 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1973), affl'd, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974); see,
e.g., Dewitt v. American Stock Trans. Co. [1977-1978] FED. SEC. L. Rv. (CCH) 96,089,
at 91,928-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Levy v. Johnson, [1976-1977] FED. SEC. L. EP. (CCH)
95,899, at 91,324 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Meer v. United Brands Co., [1976-1977] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,648, at 90,213 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); In re Equity Funding Corp. of American Sec.
Litigation (EFCA), 416 F. Supp. 161, 190 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (McLaughlin v. Campbell, 410 F.
Supp. 1321, 1325 (D. Mass. 1976); Meyers v. American Leisure Time Enterprises, Inc., 402
F. Supp. 213, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
51 In its report to the House of Representatives, the Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee divided the provisions of the Act into six categories: a) control of credits; b)
control of manipulative practices; c) provision of adequate and honest reports to securities
holders by registered corporations; d) control of unfair practices of corporate insiders; e)
control of exchanges and over-the-counter markets; f) administration. See H.R. REP. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934). See generally 4 LEoIsLATIrv HISTORY OF THE SECURTIES Acr
OF 1933 AND SECUmIs EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934 (1973).
uH.R. REp. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934).
"4 Id. Similar public policy considerations underlie each of the reporting provisions of the
Act. The availability of information crucial to investment decisions was needed to renew
investor confidence following the 1929 stock market crash. It was hoped that such renewed
confidence, combined with governmental regulation, would avert future market crises and
their consequences. Id. at 2; S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Seas. (1934).
57 Prior to the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976), the
securities field was unregulated. Excessive speculation and inordinate margin purchasing
were major contributing factors to the economic depression of the 1930's. During the sum-
mer of 1933, there was another "speculative boom" which demonstrated to Congress the
need for legislative regulation of the market. S. REP_. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
In his February 9, 1934 message to Congress, President Roosevelt stated that the 1933 Act
was "but one step in our broad purpose of protecting investors and depositors." He ex-
pressed hope that the 1934 legislation would expand the government's "protection of in-
vestors." See id. at 1. The courts repeatedly have acknowledged that the Act was designed
primarily to protect the investor. See Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 433 F.2d
264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430
F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970). In Boruski v. SEC, 340 F.2d 991 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
917 (1965) the court stated: "[Ilt is difficult to see how the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission could carry on its task of protection of the public investor without information
such as it sought [through § 17(a) and Rule 17a-5]." 340 F.2d at 992.
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the sole relief for violations of section 17(a), it becomes apparent
that the majority's reliance on the Cort v. Ash factors was mis-
placed, since those factors are relevant only when the statute in
question does not expressly provide a remedy. 8
Even if the Ash factors were relevant to an analysis of the
securities laws' reporting provisions, it is submitted that their appli-
cation does not support the creation of a private right of action
under section 17(a). While it seems clear that brokers' customers are
within that class of persons for whose benefit 17(a) was enacted,
section 18(a) provides substantial evidence of a congressional inten-
tion to deny a private remedy. Hence, the second of the Ash criteria
is not satisfied.59 Moreover, although the implication of a private
right would appear consistent with the legislative goal of customer
protection, an analysis of the legislative scheme indicates that this
goal was to be effectuated through public enforcement devices, such
as the threat of liquidation,"° criminal sanctions,' and SEC injunc-
tions.12 The additional protection for customers afforded by SIPC
reimbursement 3 also supports the view that the legislative purposes
underlying the reporting provisions are to be implemented by public
and not private remedies. Finally, the availability of consumer relief
in the form of state common law tort actions weighs against the need
for a private remedy predicated on section 17(a).64
See 422 U.S. at 78.
' See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
See note 17 supra.
" See note 29 supra.
62 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976). Shareholders, as well as the SEC, have the right to seek
injunctions against those who violate § 13(d), Grow Chem. Corp. v. Uran, 316 F. Supp. 891
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), and § 13(a), duPont v. Wyly, 376 F. Supp. 23 (D. Del. 1973). Moreover,
issuers of securities have been granted the right to bring injunctive suits based on § 13(d)
violations. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972). The right to bring injunctive suits, however, does not imply a companion right to bring
damage actions. See duPont v. Wyly, 376 F. Supp. 23 ((D. Del. 1973).
13 See note 16 supra.
"6 State courts have long been faced with the dilemma of determining when liability
should be imposed upon accountants in suits brought by parties with whom they are not in
privity of contract. In the landmark decision Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven, & Co., 255
N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), a case involving accountants' common law liability, the New
York Court of Appeals held that a party not in privity may recover only if the accountant is
guilty of fraud. The court stated that "fraud" might include a "reckless misstatement" or
the "insincere profession of an opinion" but that an "honest blunder" should not result in
liability. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448. In State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d
416 (1938), the Court of Appeals held that, even in the absence of deliberate fraud, accoun-
tants may be held liable to third parties for conduct that would support an inference of fraud,
including a "refusal to see the obvious" or a "failure to investigate the doubtful." Id. at 107,
15 N.E.2d at 419; accord, Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255, 266 (D. Or. 1972).
Several recent decisions have expanded accountant liability to permit recovery in negli-
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With its decision in Redington, the Second Circuit has become
the only court to have found a private right under a reporting provi-
sion of the Act.65 In its apparent avoidance of the "purchase and
sale" doctrine,67 the court has exposed accountants to an unantici-
pated possibility of liability to individuals whose losses are not di-
rectly caused by the professional's misconduct. Such exposure, it is
submitted, could result in a hesitancy among professionals to en-
gage in the preparation of section 17(a) reports, thereby defeating
Congress' desire to protect customers of brokerage firms. It is hoped
that in future cases the courts will ameliorate the negative effects
of the Redington decision by establishing a set of clear and narrowly
drawn requirements for maintaining a private action for damages
under section 17(a).11
Robin J. Stalbow
gence in instances where the accountant knew that the injured party would rely on his work
and where these parties are members of a determinate class. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l
Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner, & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972); Rusch Factors,
Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968); White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 372 N.E.2d
315, 401 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1977). But see Stephens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357,
360 (10th Cir. 1971) (fraud or misrepresentation required for actions by those not in privity).
For a history of accountant liability to third parties, see Note, Accountants' Liabilities for
FaLse and Misleading Financial Statements, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1437 (1967).
See notes 46-55 and accompanying text supra.
" See note 38 supra.
The reasoning that led the Supreme Court to establish a scienter requirement in Rule
10b-5 private damages actions, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), arguably
could be applied in private suits brought under § 17(a). The Hochfelder Court based its
holding, in part, upon its conclusion that plaintiffs should not be permitted to circumvent
the absolute defense of good faith, which is available under § 18(a), by bringing suits for
negligent misconduct under Rule 10b-5. 425 U.S. at 200. A second factor that influenced the
Hochfelder Court was the absence of procedural safguards in § 10(b) analogous to those
provided in the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976), which expressly permits
private recovery for negligent conduct. 425 U.S. at 209-10. Finally, the Hochfelder Court was
persuaded by Congress' express rejection of negligence as a basis for imposing liability for
damages under § 18(a). See 425 U.S. at 211 n.31. It is submitted that these considerations
could be invoked by the courts to justify the creation.of a scienter requirement in § 17(a)
actions for damages. In addition, the courts could utilize devices such as a reliance require-
ment to insure that accountants are held liable only when their misconduct directly caused
the plaintiff's loss. Cf. Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968) (actual reliance on the
document required for § 18(a) causes of action).
